Not too long into the 2023 St. Louis Cardinals season, I suggested that the St. Louis Cardinals should extend Jordan Walker. They didn’t, which on one hand means that the Cardinals have not secured the services of the most exciting young player that the franchise has to offer, but it also means I have the opportunity to squeeze more content out of this story, which I appreciate.

If you were one who was inclined to perceive Jordan Walker as the second coming of Albert Pujols, his 2023 campaign was undoubtedly a massive disappointment. When he made the Cardinals’ Opening Day roster, it was not unreasonable to list him among the favorites for National League Rookie of the Year alongside the award’s eventual recipient, Arizona Diamondbacks outfielder Corbin Carroll. But after a hot start, Walker’s bat cooled down and his defense, though never expected to be a strength, turned out to a very visible liability.

By the end of the season, Walker’s statistics weren’t awful: His 116 wRC+ rated ahead of that of the Show-Me-State’s other super-prospect, the two-years-Walker’s-senior Bobby Witt Jr. of the Kansas City Royals. But the major difference was that while Witt Jr. was a highly regarded and rated shortstop, Jordan Walker was a poor defensive corner outfielder. For Walker to be in the range of Witt as an overall player, a particularly relevant comp since Witt signed an eleven-year, $288.7 million contract earlier this month, he needs to take a major leap forward at the plate, improve dramatically in the field, or probably some combination of the two.

To be clear, I am not advocating that the Cardinals should offer Jordan Walker an identical contract to Bobby Witt Jr., not because I don’t think it’s possible that Walker could perform to that level and not because I wouldn’t rather Jordan Walker have a quarter-billion or so dollars than the DeWitt family, but because, as a fan of the St. Louis Cardinals, I want them to use their resources wisely and efficiently, and there’s no reason to believe that Walker, coming off a season broadly viewed as disappointing, couldn’t be had at a much lower rate than Witt, coming off a season broadly viewed as a major step up from his own somewhat underwhelming rookie campaign.

In any marketplace, buying low is the smart financial play, and there are plenty of surface-level arguments against Jordan Walker right now. But there are also plenty of arguments that improvement is imminent. His offensive numbers were not quite Pujolsian over the course of a full MLB season, but they improved later in the season, including a 133 wRC+ in September, demonstrating improvement in his busiest professional season towards the end of what turned out to be his busiest month of Major League Baseball yet. His one true offensive dip, in July, coincided with a bizarrely low .246 batting average on balls in play, which would seem low if Yadier Molina had come out of retirement and immediately started running the bases after making contact again, much less for a relatively quick young player like Walker.

Defense is where any true detractors of Jordan Walker would likely head first, and the raw numbers would back up their claims. By Ultimate Zone Rating, a solid statistic if not one that necessarily can tell the entire picture over the relative small sample size of one season, Jordan Walker was the fifth worst defensive player in Major League Baseball last season, being outpaced by negative UZR only by two well-established designated hitters who, because of Bryce Harper’s injury rehab, were rarely allowed to play their natural positions for the Philadelphia Phillies (Nick Castellanos and Kyle Schwarber), an extremely fast center fielder who almost certainly would have been moved to a corner for his own self-esteem’s sake if the Oakland Athletics cared enough to do anything that might help them win baseball games (Esteury Ruiz), and a catcher-by-trade shuffled off to right field upon debuting in the Major Leagues for the Pittsburgh Pirates (Henry Davis).

But not unlike Davis, also a highly regarded prospect (Davis was the number-one overall pick in the 2021 draft), Jordan Walker was also thrown into right field somewhat spontaneously. Jordan Walker was a third baseman until about midway through the 2022 season, at which point the St. Louis Cardinals seemed to realize they had Nolan Arenado (more generously, were probably convinced Arenado would not exercise his post-2022 opt-out) and tried Walker, a competent but never extraordinary third baseman, in the outfield. When Walker made the St. Louis Cardinals out of Spring Training in 2023, he had logged just 249 outfield innings in affiliated professional baseball.

Although Walker certainly never ascended to the ranks of “good” defensive outfielders, he did visibly improve throughout the season–his previously awful defensive route running looked on the border of competent by the end of 2023, coupled with decent speed, a strong throwing arm, and not nearly as much outright clumsiness in the field as one might have expected. Faint praise, sure, but there has never been an expectation that Jordan Walker would ever be a premium defensive player–rising to adequacy was all that anyone in the organization could have reasonable acted to happen. And if Walker’s outfield adventures resurface in 2024, there could easily be a new position opening up for him in 2025–first base, as Paul Goldschmidt is a pending free agent (and even if he re-signs with the Cardinals, will be 37 by Opening Day 2025 and will probably be preparing for more games as a designated hitter). Because of the nature of defensive positional adjustments, Jordan Walker at first base would almost certainly never become a genuinely valuable fielder, but he also poses, unless he is unable to catch a ball thrown to him, fewer opportunities to hurt the team with his poor defense.

I think about a guy who, hometown aside, has virtually nothing in common with Jordan Walker as a player–Atlanta Braves center fielder Michael Harris II. Unlike Walker, Michael Harris II made an immediate, major splash in his rookie season, winning National League Rookie of the Year thanks to a 137 wRC+ and strong center field defense. The Braves, who unlike the Cardinals tend to offer pre-arbitration contract extensions like candy on Halloween, signed Harris to an eight-year, $72 million extension with two team options tacked on to the end. And while Michael Harris II took a step back in 2023, with a wRC+ of 115 which fell below the offensive mark of Jordan Walker, FanGraphs estimates his open market value at $31.7 million. Extrapolating that Harris had earned 44% of his salary in 12.5% of the time would be misguided–the Braves, after all, could have paid Harris a league minimum salary for another couple years before reaching cost-controlled salary arbitration–but even with a down season, there is no doubt that the Atlanta Braves are still extremely excited about this contract.

There is a reason that smart teams tend to sign players before they have to do so–it usually works out. The Braves are the most famous example, having signed Ronald Acuña Jr. at a low price and Ozzie Albies at a borderline criminal price, in addition to extensions for the aforementioned Harris, Spencer Strider, Austin Riley, and others. Earlier this off-season, the Milwaukee Brewers signed minor league center fielder Jackson Chourio to an eight-year, $82 million extension before he makes his MLB debut and before he concludes his teenage years. This isn’t a fool-proof system–the Philadelphia Phillies and Seattle Mariners weren’t exactly enthused by the six-year, $24 million contracts they gave, respectively, to Scott Kingery and Evan White, but these are minimal costs compared to the upside that most of these extensions have.

For a localized example, consider the extension of Paul DeJong, one which garnered plenty of gripes near the end of it. Not unlike Jordan Walker would, DeJong signed an extension following his rookie season, one which earned him $25 million through the end of the 2023 season (this number includes the $2 million buyout of his 2024 team option). The total expenditure incurred by the Cardinals, who traded Paul DeJong last July, was around $22.97 million–the $25 million figure less the $1.32 million that the Toronto Blue Jays paid him less the proration of DeJong’s 2020 salary. By the measure of FanGraphs, DeJong was worth $67.3 million to the Cardinals. Again, the team could have gone year-to-year with DeJong, but given how productive DeJong was in his thirty-dinger, All-Star season of 2019, there isn’t really a lot of evidence to suggest he would have made much less than $23 million with the Cardinals anyway, and they even got minor league pitcher Matt Svanson as salvage value for him. And this is with the situation going on the poor side for the team, a scenario where they bought out his contract rather than taking advantage of team options which are inherently team-friendly by virtue of them having the option.

The reason to extend Jordan Walker coming off a somewhat disappointing season is because you believe that Jordan Walker will have a robust season and will thus be quite a bit more expensive. I do not pretend to know what Jordan Walker would demand, but there is a fairly substantial range between “amount that would make Jordan Walker generationally wealthy” and “amount that should be too rich for the Cardinals’ blood”. The Cardinals should make Walker an offer within that range.